

# **Irony, quotation, and other forms of staged intertextuality**

Double or contrastive perspectivation in conversation

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In this article I apply concepts of perspectivation (Graumann 1989, 1993, Kallmeyer/Keim 1996, Sandig 1996), intertextuality and polyphonic voicing (Bakhtin 1981) to conversational irony, parody, and comic quotation. The concepts of perspectivation and polyphonic voicing can help to distinguish various forms of doubly-voiced speech from one another, basically forms of unintroduced citation and irony. "Voicing" means that people speak not just "as themselves," but inhabitate a role for which they must perform a voice which is recognizable to their audience. I criticize the "mention-approach to irony" of Sperber & Wilson (1981) and Wilson & Sperber (1992) for not distinguishing between playful quotation and irony. "Staged intertextuality" is proposed in this article as a higher-order concept for various ways of animating voices (in the sense of Goffman 1981). Many discourse analysts (Tannen 1984, Sperber & Wilson 1981, Wilson & Sperber 1992, Barbe 1995) understand quite diverse types of "staged intertextuality" as irony, which is unsatisfying. Irony research has dealt to a much greater extent with what differentiates ironic from serious utterances than with what differentiates ironic from parodying or playful quoting activities. I mainly intend to clarify one distinction in this field of comically staged intertextuality: that between consonant and dissonant processing of two simultaneous voices. I view not only irony, but also many forms of unintroduced citation and parody as two-voiced or doubly perspectivized speech. Only irony is considered as a type of doubly-voiced speech that transmits a cleft of evaluative perspectives as its main message. With Giora (1995) I assume that an ironic utterance has two meaning levels which must be processed: the said and the implicated. We deal with the phenomenal area of multiple voicing on the basis of natural discourse data, which contain sequences of ironic utterances and responses. Irony research to often worked with artificial examples of isolated ironic utterances without response which do not do justice to the complexity and achievement of conversational irony in context. Finally, I consider how the bracketing-off of staged intertextuality indexes social identities and relationships, and how they are audience related. Allusions to shared knowledge about ways of speaking play a significant role whereby group membership can be indexed and participation frameworks recreated. I aim at connecting conversation analysis, ethnography and cognition theory.

## 1. Introduction

Scholars have dealt with the phenomenon of irony for centuries.<sup>ii</sup> Obviously one can say one thing when one means the opposite — and this meaning reversal can be implicitly indicated (Muecke 1969; Booth 1974).

The more recent debate has dealt with possible motives for irony, its recognizability and the question whether irony signals are necessary (Weinrich 1966; Cutler 1974; Stempel 1976; Myers Roy 1977). The necessity of irony signals is denied by most researchers; however, prosodic, kinetic or purely contextual indications are often found. There are no strategies which refer exclusively to irony, but there are contextualization processes in the sense of Cook-Gumperz/Gumperz (1976) and Auer/die Luzio (1991) which can ironize utterances (Groeben/Scheele 1984; Elstermann 1991; Barbe 1995; Hartung 1998; Kotthoff 1998, Clift 1999). A widely held view (Stempel 1976, Lapp 1992: 123; Hartung 1996, 1998) is that

irony involves oppositions in which the relationship between the said ("dictum") and the meant (in Grice's terminology "implicatum" or "implicated") is basically one of an opposition between positive and negative evaluation; some, however, would like to drop the idea of an opposition entirely (e.g., Barbe 1995), with the result that a great variety of different humorous remarks are declared ironic, making an internal differentiation impossible (Kotthoff 1997). In any case the idea of an opposition alone inadequately explains what can be achieved by irony and cannot be achieved by other forms of speech.

Searle (1975) considers irony to be an example of nonliteral language. With literal language speakers mean what they say and more, whereas with nonliteral language speakers do not mean what they say, but instead mean something else. This substitution, however, does not explain why speakers choose to use irony, since the literal phrase would be equivalent. Sperber & Wilson (1981) answered the question of why people express their ideas ironically instead of directly with the notion that in irony an additional meaning is expressed in the following sense: the position brought out in irony was already uttered (dictum), but it is wrong (implicatum). Cases like this can easily be found. Let's imagine children who tell their mother that they are going to go upstairs to their room to do homework. After a while the mother hears loud music, goes up to the room, sees the children dancing and says: "Oh, you are doing your homework." The ironist (the mother) only mentions the dictum and distances herself implicitly from the cited words. Sperber's and Wilson's (1981) theory can only handle cases like this. Furthermore, they think that listeners process only what the ironist meant, not what she/he said. Stempel (1976) had a similar idea some years earlier, but a bit more complex. He assumes that the ironic speaker derives the opposition potential of the irony from a hypothesis about her/his addressee, in the sense of: I attribute the attitude which is expressed in my irony to you (dictum), but I distance myself from it (implicatum). For this approach it is not necessary to repeat a position someone already expressed with contrastive sense. Watching old-fashioned bags in a shop window the ironist might say to her old-fashioned friend in an exaggerated way: "Look how cute they are," thereby attributing to the friend that these bags would match her taste, the speaker's, however, not at all.

Sperber & Wilson (1981), Sperber (1984) and Wilson & Sperber (1992) think of irony as the prototype of speech in which the literal meaning is not used to transmit a message, but to mention it (as an echo), and at the same time to express an attitude toward the message. Irony thereby becomes a prototypical case of utterances which are mentioned, doubly coded through unIntroduced citation (echoing). They are at the same time the speakers' words and somebody else's. Complex implicit inference instructions (which Sperber and Wilson do not explain) demand that listeners delete the said in favor of the meant. In this paper I question the assertion that irony is the prototype of doubly voiced speech. As recent research on reported speech (Tannen 1989, Günthner 1997, 1998, in this volume, Couper-Kuhlen 1998,

Klewitz/Couper-Kuhlen 1999) shows, for many forms of quotation speakers use verbal and prosodic techniques to contextualize their evaluative stance towards the quoted (or constructed) dialogues. Not every quotation, however, can be considered ironic. One differentiation between irony and quotation might be: in quoting speakers indicate whose words they are quoting, in irony they do not. But this is likewise untrue. Often without any introduction speakers suddenly speak with the voice of another person (as will be shown below).

I would like to show that echoing and double perspectivation are not limitable to irony, but rather also appear in many other forms of polyphonic communication (e.g., humorous communication), especially when others' voices are adopted in one's own speech. It is not solely the case with irony that the role of the speaker is simply split into the one who speaks (animator in Goffman's terms, 1981) and the one from whom the statement originates (author in Goffman's terms, 1981), as Sperber & Wilson (1981) seem to hold in their irony theory of echo and mentioning. "Mentioning" is furthermore an unfortunate term, because it also means that something is said only by the way.

Still another aspect of these irony researchers' theory is of interest to us here. For Wilson & Sperber (1992: 75) and most other irony researchers ironic speech has only one message: "It is a variety of echoic interpretive use, in which the communicator dissociates herself from the opinion echoed with accompanying ridicule or scorn." "What a lovely party!" is said to echo a specific or imagined opinion and simultaneously that this opinion is absurd. The message that such an opinion is absurd is given as the only relevant one, the other is dropped. In contrast to this, Giora (1995, 1997), Giora & Kotthoff (1997), Giora & Fein (1998) and Kotthoff (1998, forthcoming) assume that in irony the direct meaning is not dropped, but rather that the difference between dictum and implicatum communicates the most relevant information. According to them, both levels of the utterance (the literal and the implicated) are processed. If someone says in the middle of a boring party, "What a lovely party," he wants it understood that his expectation and the actual situation differ greatly. Only this contrastive perspectivation, which is possible in irony, can explain why irony is superior to what is said directly and why one accepts the high processing cost. With irony the speaker wants to make a cleft visible.<sup>iii</sup>

Stempel's (1976) irony model already implied another idea which will be worked out in this article. He starts from the classical triple setting of ironist, irony object and public, whereby he concedes that the object and the public can quite easily be the same. He writes that the ironist draws the opposition potential from the second person (object/ target), which he/she contrasts with his/her own opinions, views and attitudes, etc., or those of people in general. In explaining the achievement of irony Stempel did not focus on breaching perspectives, but thought of irony as a sort of indirect critique. Like other irony analysts (Groeben/Scheele 1984), he took the idea of a three-person interaction model from Freud's (1905) situation of

telling sexually explicit jokes: The first person (speaker) explicitly refers in the said in an affirmative manner to a second person (addressee) whom he in reality, however, attacks with an implicit (or implicated) denial or affirmation and thereby exposes or criticizes in front of the third person, the hearer. As is the case here, irony is often dealt with as a form of critique or exposure, but that is not a necessary condition for irony, as will be shown.<sup>iv</sup> Here we take up Stempel's idea of attributing a position/perspective to a partner. In his approach the ironist does not echo a position, but attributes one to the partner. This is a broader notion, since it can include echoing. In irony the speaker shows the partner his or her assumptions about what the partner (or another person) might think. We can gain access to another specificity of irony: it allows a complex communication of attitudes and perspectives. The interlocking of perspectives and meta-perspectives in communication has been shown by G.H. Mead (1934) and later by Laing (1969). Especially Laing (1969) underlined that in communication we do not simply show what we think of one another, but also what we think our partner might think of her/himself, a schema that could logically be extended *ad infinitum*. These complexities of implicit communicates are nowadays discussed as meta-pragmatics (Verschueren 2000).

Irony has a lot to do with intertwined social perspectives as they are delineated by Mead and Laing. It has the wonderful ability to reflect to other people not only what we think, but also what we think they might think — and also our distance from that thinking. We must deal with the question of whether in irony the said in fact is always attributed to the addressee (as Stempel thinks) or whether it could simply be projected to a particular stereotypical human being.

Presumably the simplicity of many irony concepts results from the fact that researchers have seldom dealt with ironic communication in context.<sup>v</sup> The greatest share of the literature cited by Lapp (1992) works with rather simple, invented examples, and even more with isolated utterances.<sup>vi</sup> In addition, in the rhetorical tradition irony was assigned to the public domain. One must agree with Hartung (1996, 1998) that up until today irony in private communication has not been empirically studied in linguistics. Irony is well known to work with allusions,<sup>vii</sup> and in contrast to the banal examples so beloved by many researchers these have something to do with the shared social history of the interactants. For this reason irony research is methodically demanding, since it cannot be limited to pure textual analysis. Even conversation analysis, with its limitation to analyzing only those phenomena which become apparent at the surface level of conversation (Schegloff 1988), is too limited to reconstruct the complexities of (meta-)message structures in irony. Thus we need an ethnographic grasp of the interactants' knowledge in order to understand what they are alluding to and where the provocative potential lies that so often makes irony witty and a bit impertinent.

In order to avoid the error of declaring irony to be the prototype of echo communication and citation, I deal in the next section with non-ironic forms of citation.

The examples used are exclusively oral episodes. My data stem from a corpus of twenty dinner conversations among good friends and acquaintances (Kotthoff 1998). During these gatherings there are frequent cases of irony and playful citation.

## **2. Quotation and polyphony**

In everyday conversation we meet different forms of integration of others' voices into one's own speech, as was already discussed in early Russian cultural semiotics in the twenties and thirties (Bakhtin 1981; Voloshinov 1978). Voloshinov (1978) states that in reported speech we always find an overlap of voices, that of the current speaker or author and that of the quoted person or invented hero. He (1978: 153) distinguishes two types of "reported speech" in literature. One type involves stylistic homogeneity. It works strongly with indirect speech. Voloshinov finds it, e.g., realized in classical Russian literature. The other type individualizes both the characters' and the narrator's speech. He refers to this as relativistic individualism and illustrates it with examples taken from the writings of Dostoevski and A. Belyi. Their characters are given substance by their own quoted speech, by direct speech. Direct discourse makes possible ellipses, omissions and various types of emotive tendencies, which are lost in indirect speech.

In Bakhtin's and Voloshinov's theory the dialogic text is understood as doubly or multiply directed: it characterizes the author and her/his protagonists at the same time. It makes poly-perspectival reading (and hearing) possible. Polyperspectivity is by no means exclusive for irony as Sperber and Wilson seem to imply in their "mention theory." Different voices can overlap in many forms; they can be consonant or dissonant (as will be shown). Only in the latter case do we speak of irony.

With citation it makes a difference whether a person is explicitly or implicitly cited. In the case of explicit or announced citation, a person's reported speech is attributed to the person by means of a *verbum dicendi*. This does not mean, however, that the speaker subjects himself to the demands of authenticity:

In direct contrast with this view, I am claiming that when a speaker represents an utterance as the words of another, what results is by no means describable as "reported speech." Rather it is constructed dialogue. And the construction of the dialogue represents an active, creative, transforming move which expresses the relationship not between the quoted party and the topic of talk but rather the quoting party and the audience to whom the quotation is delivered. (Tannen 1989: 109)

Günthner (1997, 1998, in this volume) shows that in reporting past dialogue sequences, speakers not only reconstruct past utterances, but often at the same time implicitly comment on these reported utterances and thus communicate their points of view concerning the reported words.

## 2.1. Quotation introduced formally

In so-called reported speech we also find overlapping voices. The current listeners are simultaneously transformed into witnesses of the presented dialogue. The reporter's voice stages the voice of the cited person in such a way that two intentions and two perspectives overlap.

In episode 1 a dialogue is (re)constructed between the narrator (Ulf) and several women in a shop. One woman was selling kitchen appliances, and a group of women around her were chatting about the appliances when Ulf joined the conversation as a man who staged himself as also being interested in kitchen equipment.

### Episode 1

Anni (A), Bernada (B), David (D), Erika (E), Johannes (J), Katharina (K), Ulf (U)

- 1 U: ich war auch mal bei so ner Küchenvorführung für  
*I was also once at such a cooking demonstration for*  
2 heimische Küchenmaschinen,  
*home kitchen appliances,*  
3 K: ja  
*yes*  
4 U: bei Huber auf der Klosterstätte.  
*at Huber on Klosterstätte.*  
5 A: (? ?)  
6 U: und dann hat die Frau so Fragen gestellt,  
*and then the woman asked questions,*  
-> 7 und dann hab ich gesagt, also ich find ja beim Rührteig,  
*and then I said, well I really find with batter,*  
-> 8 hat er ja ne gewissen Schwäche.  
*it really has a certain weakness.*  
9 D: HAHAHAHA  
-> 10 U: und die Frau <<p>ja woher wisset Sie des?>  
*and the woman <<p>well how do you know that?>*  
11 ich, ja denken Sie ich mach keine Kuchen?  
*I well do you think I do not make cakes?*  
12 und und dann hab ich mit der rumgefachsimpelt über  
*and and then I talked shop with her about*  
13 über Rüblitorte und was ich fürn Rezept hätte  
*about carrot cake and what sort of recipe I had*  
14 E: und da dachten=se nicht, Du bist professioneller KonditHAor?  
*and didn't they think you are a professional pastry coHOok?*  
-> 15 U: nein <<p>und dann hat se gemeint> <<p>ja wissen Sie>  
*no <<p>and then she said> <<p>well you know>*  
16 weil am Anfang ham se gelacht, ne?  
*because at the start they laughed you know?*  
17 ?: mhm  
*uhu*

- > 18 U: und ham gedacht, was will denn der Depp da.  
*and they thought what does that dope want.*
- 19 E: HEHE
- > 20 U: der Mann, der keHEntt sich doch überhaupt nich aus,  
*the man, he knows nothing at all about it,*
- 21 E: jaHAHA  
*yesHAHA*
- 22 U: wenn=s um Küchenmaschinen geht.  
*when we are talking about kitchen appliances.*
- > 23 und dann wurde mir also verspätet zugegeben <<p>ja die Männer  
heute,  
*and then it was admitted somewhat late <<p>yes the men today,*
- > 24 die brauchen auch sowas.>  
*they also need such things.>*
- > 25 E: HEHEHEHEHE
- 26 U: ham se sich daHA alsoHE allgemein ausgeHEtauscht,  
*they generallyHI exchaHAnged opiniHOons,*
- 27 HEHE daß die ZeiHEten sich geändert haben.  
*HEHE that tiHEmes have changed.*
- 28 E: HEHEHEHEHE
- 29 U: fand ich sehr schön irgendwie.  
*I found that really nice somehow.*

Ulf tells his friends how he once attended a kitchen appliance demonstration at "Huber," a shop everybody present knows. In lines 7 and 8 he reports on how he took part in the demonstration. He gave a commentary in the manner of an expert (*Rührteig/batter*) and in a rather stilted language (*gewisse Schwäche/certain weakness*). David immediately laughs. The stilted formulation here contextualizes a humorous frame for the narrated instance. Ulf draws on a register which is unusual for him. The kitchen appliance demonstrator is staged in line 10 in direct speech using South-German dialect (*wisset Sie des*); her reported speech is presented in a soft voice. She is portrayed as being astonished about a man's competence in kitchen appliances. After that, in line 11, the narrator portrays himself in standard German. Dialect seems to be identified with backwardness and conservatism here, standard speech with progressiveness. He uses no *verba dicendi*. "The woman" and "I" seem to be enough as an introduction. In line 12 a metalinguistic orientation is given to the further topical course of the reconstructed conversation: they talked shop about carrot cake. Erika asks what impression he made on the kitchen appliance saleswoman (*pastry cook*); Ulf replies in the negative. In line 15, Ulf commences a further, not consistently maintained, staging of the saleswoman. Then he goes back in time to the beginning of the dialogue and also stages the thoughts of the women present (18, 20, 22). It is far from realistic to imagine that all the women present in the shop would be of the same mind. But this fictitious element does not create a problem for the recipients. It is evident that Ulf stages himself as a progressive man who is interested in cooking, and the women in that shop as astonished about this fact. Erika laughs in lines 21, 25 and 28. At the end, the women are again constructed as persons who



have learned their lesson about the new man (*times have changed*). Ulf summarizes the consciousness raising impression of the women and in conclusion makes a positive evaluation of the whole exchange (*really nice somehow*). The group is amused by the little talk show he (re)staged at the table.

We can speak with Lachmann (1990, 1996) of "staged intertextuality" here.<sup>viii</sup> Dressler/ de Beaugrande (1981) advocate a concept of intertextuality as a feature of all texts. All texts can in some way be located in a history of texts. We do not wish to work with such a broad concept of intertextuality here, but are rather interested only in those texts in which procedures can be recognized which create two voices/perspectives/meanings.

My data show various forms of doubly directed speech which are similar to irony: There are citations introduced formally, as in episode 1, in which the voices of the protagonists are clearly parodied, i.e., exaggeratedly spoken with a specific stylizing intention (standard or even stilted language vs. dialect, loud voice vs. soft voice). In this case amusement or critique can be at stake; the protagonists are presented in a way that we can laugh at them<sup>ix</sup> or get angry about them or pity them or whatever. With the help of specific contextualization strategies we manage to reveal certain affects. A social typification process is worked into the directly reported speech. X can portray himself as Y, which is far from mirroring the actual state of affairs. Typified constructed speech (Brünner 1991) can be an important element in the performance of indignation (Günthner 1997), but also in the performance of humorous speech, as was shown above.

Brünner (1991) has shown that reported speech can contain verbal and intonatory characterizations which serve as means for transmitting stereotypical characterizations of persons, social groups, etc. In the episode presented above Ulf portrays himself as a typically progressive man and the women in contrast as typically conservative women who still believe the kitchen is a woman's realm. Intertextual humor allows the teller to demonstrate and test for very special sorts of shared knowledge and attitudes (see also Jaffe 2000 on that issue).

Double processing is presumably the case here, because hearers detect the staging procedure and also what effects are thereby intended. This, however, can seldom be shown in their responses.<sup>x</sup> It is simply not usual in everyday situations to comment on staging qualities, here that the women were perhaps not that impressed by Ulf's progressiveness or that Ulf exaggerated and reshaped reality a bit. Truth values are often not very important in everyday life.

## **2.2. Quotation which is unannounced**

I will now discuss cases which in my opinion come a bit closer to the ironic (but are still far away) and are counted as ironic in Sperber and Wilson's approach, cases of so-called pseudo-citation. Double processing is not exclusively limited to irony (as was already said), we also find it in all forms of citation, pseudo-citation and parody.

I cite a passage from Tannen's book, *Conversational Style*, in order to make clear the domain of conversational pseudo-citation which interests me most.<sup>xi</sup>

In his role as host, Steve is frequently in the position of giving orders to people and offering them food. He frequently mocks his own behavior in this role by affecting a stereotypical Jewish speech pattern. For example, when someone offers to help him, he replies, 'You should sit and relax dahlink!' His use of the modal 'should', exaggerated intonation, and stylized voice quality and pronunciation are all patterned on the speech of Steve's grandmother, who immigrated to the United States from Poland. Thus, he is mocking his own impulse to pattern his hosting behavior on her model. (Tannen 1984: 132-133).

Tannen offers an example of citation without warning (announcement) here which I call pseudo-citation. With pseudo-citation the author of the reported utterance is often of no interest. It suffices that a recognizable type is identifiable from whom the staged utterance originates, e.g., the hyper-concerned housewife, the classical petit bourgeois or the fussy professor (Schwitalla 1994, 1995). The particularity of comprehension consists in grasping the theatrical frame. This theatrical frame does not automatically mean that the said is not meant, as would be the case in irony. Tannen's Steve really wants to be a good host, and he really wants his guests to remain seated. The imitation of familiar patterns (acting in a theatrical frame in the sense of Haiman 1990) leads to a minimal distancing from the said, but not to a contrast. It directs attention to the manner of speaking and endows it with the qualities of performance (Kotthoff 1996a, 1998, Jaffe 2000).

In the next episode Maria behaves like a professional waiter while serving a fish dish.

Episode 2 (Conversation 6 Episode 2)

Anni (A), Bernada (B), David (D), Johannes (J), Katharina (K), Maria (M), Ulf (U)

-> 1 M: RÜEBLIFISCH (-) RÜEBLIFISCH (- -)  
CARROT FISH (-) CARROT FISH (- -)

-> 2 U: Rüeblijfisch.  
Carrot fish.

3 ?: <<p>ojeoje>

4 M: [RüHEHE

-> 5 U: [gu::t, des machsch ja schon wie in  
[goo::d, you do it just like in

-> 6 Ebbing. jaHA[HA  
Ebbing. yesHA[HA

7 M: [HEHEHEHA[HAHAHAHA

8 a: [HEHAHAHA

-> 9 U: jetzt hamma Rüeblijfisch?  
<schweizerische Intonation>  
now we have carrot fish?  
<Swiss intonation >

10 m: HEHEHEHEHE

11 U: Rüblifisch à la Diener.  
Carrot fish à la waiter.

- 12 K: HAHAHA[HAHA  
13 M: [HEHEHEHE (1.0)

Maria brings a large platter from the kitchen holding a carrot fish dish (in Swiss German "Rüebli-fisch"). She parodies a Swiss professional waiter whom those present know. She calls out the Swiss name for this dish and thereby demonstratively plays restaurant. When announcing the course, Maria incorporates the voice of the waiter into her own voice. Ulf repeats this announcement, likewise with a typical waiter intonation. Someone utters a sceptical interjection (3), which presumably refers to the serving of the large platter. Ulf interrupts Maria's renewed exclamation with a compliment (5/6). He names the location of a restaurant where various persons in the room have already eaten together. In this classy and pricey restaurant the courses are announced in a similar manner. Ulf himself plays the Swiss waiter in line 9. A few participants laugh. Ulf now specifies the fish dish in relation to the cook, whose last name just happens to be *Diener* (literally 'Waiter' in German). They can use the name playfully here, because the *Diener/waiter* has just 'served' the participants in the kitchen. In the wordplay the cook's family name can be saucily assigned a function. Katharina and Maria laugh.

The action of bringing out a course is used by Maria to start a brief performance in which Ulf himself soon takes part. Maria's role performance plays on the background knowledge shared by those present, their familiarity with the serving praxis at the Swiss restaurant. The locality is coupled with the action here, for the speech activity of imitating a Swiss waiter can only be understood in connection with the action. In line 11 Ulf enriches the designation of the menu course in a word play which is here locally cohesive. A potential motive for this sort of conversational citation is that one implicitly also communicates that this evening the food will be as good as at the expensive Ebingen restaurant. The general amusement about the change of roles, the imitation and evocation of shared background knowledge should not be underestimated. Added to this is an amused adoption of Swiss speech patterns by Germans who live in Switzerland. Participants are playfully practicing the foreign intonation lines (especially in line 9).

Presumably another function of such an evocation is that people can collectively remember scenes without having to make this explicit.

In this episode the quality of the performance is addressed in the reception (in lines 5 and 6 Ulf comments on Maria's activity, and in lines 2 and 9 he co-stages the Swiss waiter): Although I do not want to maintain that this is always the case with pseudo-citation, the reception here shows that the performance and evocative dimensions are central to the communicative practice carried out; theatricality as such is set as relevant.

The pseudo-citations do not serve here to create critical distance. There seems to be a whole range of implicit evaluations in pseudo-citations from sympathetic or positive to unsympathetic or negative. But one thing is always clear: The utterances are borrowed, they

are attributed to someone else. These echo utterances are, however, not ironic. There is no contrasting perspectivation.

Many discourse analysts (Tannen 1984, Sperber/Wilson 1981, Wilson/Sperber 1992, Barbe 1995) understand quite diverse types of "staged intertextuality" as irony. My intention is to make a distinction clear in this field of unannounced staged intertextuality: that between consonant and dissonant processing of the two voices. I do not consider utterances like "You should sit and relax, dahlink" to be ironic. They do not in all cases share an essential attribute of the ironic: that of communicating an evaluative cleft. Parody, citation, pseudo-citation and irony create a double perspectivation through the simultaneous presentation of two voices in a single utterance. But only in irony (and in sarcasm as a subtype) are the two voices contrastively evaluated, and only in irony is it central to communicate an evaluative cleft. With citation and pseudo-citation the double processing is consonant.

Researchers have repeatedly asked why we are ironic. But we must also ask why we playfully cite the utterances of other persons instead of speaking as ourselves.

Goffman (1981) assigns to the splitting up of speaker roles a much more general relevance than do Sperber/Wilson (1981), who distinguish between the use and the mentioning of a proposition only in regard to irony. Goffman distinguishes between various procedures and degrees of reducing responsibility for one's own utterances. Theatrically framed utterances seem to allow a high degree of vagueness in regard to what is really meant by the theatrically framed utterance. Strategies of contextualization (prosody, wording, mimics, gestures) are relevant in all domains of staged intertextuality.

### **3. Conversational irony in context**

In the literature critical types of irony form the majority. I will exclusively discuss examples of friendly, humorous irony, first, since these dominate in my corpus of informal gatherings among friends. Second, I have the impression that they demonstrate the effect and achievement of irony even more than the critical type. The reader will only understand the ironic utterances presented after having been given access to the shared background knowledge of the group. Very often complex relational messages are conveyed through irony.

I strongly agree with Giora's idea (1995) that irony retains both the explicit and implicated messages, so that the difference between them may be computed. Her account suggests that the surface meaning of an ironic utterance and the implicated meaning are both involved in irony processing.<sup>xii</sup> The surface meaning is not deleted, as Sperber/ Wilson (1981) and Wilson/Sperber (1992) suggest. I call the approach of double processing the "cleft approach;" it is my aim to strengthen Giora's idea that irony communicates a difference. Friendly irony shows even more than critical irony that the ironist attributes a perspective to the irony object from which she at the same time distances herself. In friendly irony listeners very often react to the literal meaning of the ironic utterance and at the same time

make clear that they also have understood the implicated meaning (Kotthoff forthcoming). Reactions to the literal side of the ironic act show that it is not deleted. Let us look at an example now:

### 3.1. Echo, attribution, perspective

In the next episode a playful framing is initiated in the first line by the inappropriate combination of *opulent* and *social life*. This steers the reception towards irony, since the utterance is stylistically marked.

Episode 3 (Conversation 14 Episode 6)

David (D), Ernst (E), Inge (I), Johannes (J), Katharina (K), Maria (M), Rudolph (R), several persons at once (m)

- > 1 M: Du hasch grad son opulentes Sozialleben.  
*You are having such an opulent social life these days.*
- > 2 D: total. total was los grad,  
*a lot. a lot has been going on lately,*
- > 3 weil ich nämlich initiativ geworden bin jetzt.  
*because I have taken the initiative now.*
- 4 M: [HAHAHAHAHAHA
- 5 K: [hab ich schon erzählt. HAHAHAHAHA  
*[I have already told them.*
- 6 m: HAHAHAHAHAHA [HAHAHAHA
- > 7 E: [was sagt er, er freut sich schon auf  
*[what is he saying, he is already looking*
- > 8 Weihnachten und Sylvester.  
*forward to Christmas and New Years Eve.*
- 9 a: HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA[HAHAHAHAHA
- > 10 E: [munkelt man. munkelt man.  
*[it is rumored. it is rumored.*
- 11 D: entweder. oder. [hab ich angeregt.  
*either. or. [I suggested.*
- 12 m: [HEHEHEHEHEHEHEHEHEHE
- > 13 K: wenn nichts los sei, Weihnachten und Sylvester,  
*if nothing is happening, Christmas and New Years Eve,*
- > 14 dann würde er verreisen. hat er gesagt. [dann fliegt er  
*then he would like to go abroad. he said. then he will fly*
- > 15 D: mhm dann flieg ich.  
*mhm then I will fly.*
- > 16 E: in die Karibik. HEHEHE[HEHEHE  
*to the Caribbean.*
- 17 M: [HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA
- 18 m: [HEHEHEHEHEHE

First I will offer some background information. The dinner takes place at Katharina and David's. Maria addresses David's *social life*. She selects an elevated and inappropriate formulation (*opulent social life*), whereby a playful modality arises. Everybody knows that David prefers a quiet life. Recently, however, he has been involved in two social events; he

participated in two dinners which took place at his house. What is ironic about Maria's remark is that she imputes to him the perspective that he currently finds his social life quite *opulent*. She shows him how she thinks he might think about his social life. She simultaneously makes clear that her perspective contrasts with his. For Maria, who likes to be among people, taking part in two social gatherings does not qualify as an *opulent social life*.

David reacts very ironically to Maria's remark. Above all the formulation *taken the initiative* is quoted from Maria and his wife Katharina, who also immediately reacts affirmatively to this and laughs. Many people present know that the view that David normally *does not take the initiative* is not his own. David's self-irony thus draws its potential from Maria and Katharina (in the sense of Stempel), who sometimes employ such psychological jargon. The others also know about the conflict-laden point of David's reclusive social life and how it is discussed. In line 6 several persons laugh.

The rapidity of David's reaction is surprising. He not only processes Maria's irony, but immediately counters it. We must assume that shared knowledge and a high degree of familiarity make it possible to respond very quickly and creatively to irony.

David responds positively to the literal meaning of Maria's remark. Reacting to the implicated would have meant to react to Maria's impression that he leads a poor social life but is forced to minimally participate in social gatherings. A reaction to the implicated would have created a serious frame of problem talk or of a debate on life styles. David's reaction, however, recreates the play frame.

David's ironic reaction is a classical case of echoic irony in Wilson and Sperber's sense. We grasp this only through background knowledge: It is Katharina and Maria who hold the opinion that David should be more active socially. Besides, David has not at all "taken the initiative," because it was his wife Katharina who invited guests for the dinners. He simply lives in the same flat and goes with the flow. David's reaction fits literally and ironically. Literally it reconfirms what Maria said — ironically it also remains coherent but mirrors her inadequate perspective. She knows quite well how he came to be present at the event. David plays with the psychological jargon used by his wife and her friend Maria.

In lines 7 and 8 Ernst alludes to the next Christmas and New Years Eve, which further intensifies the topic and the teasing of David. The background is that Katharina had invited numerous guests this year not only for Christmas, but also for New Years Eve, among others those present, and that this was definitely too much for David. He has resigned himself good-naturedly to his fate. Everyone laughs at the teasing jest that he is looking forward to the next Christmas and New Years Eve, which also implies that there will again be numerous invitations to social events.

Ernst expands on the irony by himself starting to tease David. A contrasting perspectivation is still at stake. He speaks about David in the third person, which is typical of the activity

type of teasing (Straehle 1993, Günthner 1996a). Maria's ironic insinuation that David considers his present social life to be "opulent" is now teasingly intensified. David is portrayed as wanting nothing more than to have more parties. In line 10 Ernst refers to a *rumor* which he pretends to have heard, thereby indicating the fictitious quality of his remarks.

In line 11 David seriously reports what his stated preference is (he would like to have a party on either Christmas or New Years Eve in the coming year). Everyone laughs again. Drew (1987) demonstrated that the teased person first reacts seriously to a teasing attack. David seriously explains how he made it clear to his wife Katharina that in the future he would prefer not to hold big parties at his house on Christmas and New Years Eve. This shows us his real mood.

But the teasing continues. Starting at line 13 Katharina connects David's distaste for an *opulent social life* with his disinclination to travel. David really does not enjoy trips abroad and seldom undertakes them, and the threat to take one would be the last thing one would expect from him. Everyone present shares this knowledge. David starts to take part in the teasing himself (15). He confirms the views attributed to him. This again is a reaction to the literal meaning. Ernst augments this once more by citing a destination (*the Caribbean*), about which David himself has recently mocked him, on the occasion of a flight by Ernst to the Caribbean. David had criticized visits to distant vacation goals such as the Caribbean for environmental reasons. Again the participants laugh. David's "leg is pulled", but he shows the ability to laugh at himself. Teasing can work with irony, as is the case here, and it always works additionally with exaggeration. "Tangential address" (Günthner 1996a) is typical; it underlines the performance character of the teasing.

Ironic activities are being carried out here teasingly, which everyone present finds amusing. People communicate knowledge of one another in this way and thereby affirm their identity as part of the in-group. Friendly irony allows the in-group to deal playfully with social differences, which thereby receive acceptance (Schütte 1991). Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to claim that politeness is being expressed toward David (which in the literature is often cited as a reason for irony). There is no necessity to tell David what the other people present think of him or what they think he thinks of himself. The participants leave the domain of official face politics and playfully create a high level of intimacy (Kotthoff 1996b). Irony in this case indirectly communicates a social difference to David. His friends playfully convey to him a construction of how he might see himself in regard to the topic — and also make clear that they know his real perspective. Friendly irony combines social dissonance und consonance (in the sense of Radcliffe-Brown 1952), individuation and solidarity. David's self-irony shows that he does not feel insulted by the teasing.

In concluding my discussion of this episode, I would like to emphasize once again that Maria's irony contains an attribution to David which she herself has created. It is enough

that it is plausible. David's irony, on the contrary, echoes an already existing position. Only this case is dealt with by "mention theory."

In all ironic utterances there are anchor points not only for the dictum, but also for the implicatum. If we actually "relate" the opposition potential to an already existing voice, we have the echo case of intertextuality. But there is also the other case: The ironist projects the opposition potential onto the object (as in line 1); irony thus allows different degrees of creativity (more or less creative utterances).

In the literature people are constantly asking what is actually reversed in irony. I suggest that we formulate the opposition potential of irony as contrasting evaluative perspectives. I will take an example from Stempel to make this clear: If a mother tells her son, who has just returned home dirty and with torn clothes after playing soccer: "You are really a hero," the context permits the inference that she herself has a contrary perspective but attributes to the son a perspective in which he finds himself heroic. The son can grasp this contrastively structured perspectivation contextually. Perhaps such cases and also the irony activities in Episode 3 are prototypes of the ironic. We should stop treating all cases of irony as alike; one can differentiate types which are more or less distant from the prototype of the ironic. In the cases discussed here we have the aspects of contrasting perspectivation, difference in evaluation, the attribution of the dictum to a present individual, and we have a present reference point for the implicatum, the ironist herself. Critique is by no means a central dimension, because the goal is often not to reproach anyone or to do anything similar. I do not believe that Maria and David are criticizing each other here. They are simply communicating to each other different perspectives on a relevant domain of life (sociability). The group finds this amusing. After all, the whole exchange elicits much laughter. I assume like Giora (1995: 256) that an element of surprise makes irony amusing. It can be surprising when a perspective is attributed to a person. It seems to me that it requires an additional independent sort of inference to interpret how the irony is intended: critical, sarcastic, friendly-saucy, constructive, etc. In irony meta-pragmatics plays an important role. By meta-pragmatics I mean the socioindicative potential of the meant. Irony contains metapragmatics indicators which function as anchoring devices locating linguistic form in relation to context, and their functioning as signals of the speakers' reflexive interpretations of the activities they are engaged in (Verschueren 2000).

I would like to propose a reinterpretation of Gibbs's finding (1986, Experiment 3) as to why negatively-formulated irony takes so much longer to process than positive irony ("You are a terrible friend," meaning "you are a nice friend," see Giora p. 254). It simply makes less sense to imply to people that they think ill of themselves. Irony is most often positively formulated ("you are really a hero/nice friend") because this attitude can be attributed to the addressee, the ironist taking the critical perspective. If the context makes sufficiently clear



that the irony object thinks badly of himself, positive irony is just as quickly processed as negative irony and makes as much sense.

Example: A student has exam jitters and tells the professor several times that he just can't keep anything in his head when he learns. Then the exam is held and the student gets an excellent grade. When leaving the examination room the professor says, smiling, to the student: "You really couldn't remember anything!" Both laugh.

The attribution must make sense in context. In terms of the "graded salience hypothesis of irony" (Giora 1997, Giora/Kotthoff 1997) I would even go further than presuming that the literal is also processed: The literal must make sense, too. The experiments carried out in lab studies are contextually often too odd to make sense to the raters.

### **3.2. Perspectivity and evaluation**

I suggest the concepts of perspectivity and evaluation to explain the divergence integrated in irony.<sup>xiii</sup> Perspectivation is recognized as a necessary prerequisite of human communication (Graumann 1989). The notion rests on the basic experience of multiperspectivity, basically on the insight that, with respect to one and the same object or state-of-affairs, other views than one's own are possible. The management of divergent perspectives is omnirelevant in everyday communication, irony being just one means for it. Kallmeyer/Keim (1996) define perspective setting and taking as follows:

Very generally, all human beings' perceiving and acting is done from a specific viewpoint which, together with the scope and other structural characteristics of perspective, determines the space of perception and activity. All objects are perceived and interpreted in those aspects that correspond to the given viewpoint and perspective. In verbal interaction, the taking into account of the other's perspective, at least up to a certain extent, is a constitutive precondition in order to establish an interactive exchange. As a consequence, verbal interaction is — on a certain level — structured as a process of perspective setting and perspective taking (Graumann 1989). Perspective setting means that in order to make one's actions comprehensible and to enable others to deal with one's perspective, a speaker has to reveal his/her perspective, at least up to a certain extent. Perspective taking means that recipients have to show how they interpret the manifested perspective, how they relate their own perspective to it, and to what extent they adopt the speaker's perspective, or incorporate it at least partly in their own. Perspective setting implies a claim of social relevance for the manifested perspective, and perspective taking deals with this claim. (1996: 286/287)

An ironic utterance always presents two overlapping viewpoints on the irony object which go together with implicit evaluation. Maria attributes to David the perspective that he finds his social life opulent (now exaggerated) and implies that she continues to see it as rather limited; both points of view are evaluative. David implies that she probably thinks he has now started to be socially initiative (positively evaluated) and suggests that his perspective

is the opposite. He has passively accepted things that happened to him (negatively evaluated). But here the evaluations have a playful lightness. Evaluation has not simply to do with positively/negatively fixed points but with gradations.

With Hartung (1998, translated by the author) I view the following aspects as central for an evaluation:

- i. An evaluation is a mental process in which a person assigns an object a value on a continuous scale between the positive and negative poles. The object can be any sort of entity: object, action, utterance, event, person, etc.
- ii. An evaluation is undertaken from an evaluative aspect (perspective) which sets specific characteristics as evaluatively relevant and assigns them a normative value. It thus rests on a comparison between the concrete object and a mental standard which consists of the relevant characteristics, their normative value and their weighting.
- iii. Between the individual components of object, evaluative aspect and standard there are conventional connections which develop from the practice in which the object is integrated. Without this evaluative knowledge neither common practice nor communication would be possible.

On the level of communication it is possible to (in)directly express evaluation by predication, wording, prosody, voice, mimics, explicit evaluative speech activity.

With irony it is typically the case that the evaluated activity or object deviates from a standard expectation which is implicitly co-communicated as a norm.

Spiegel (1998) emphasizes that perspectivation always has a tripartite structure consisting of a subject, location and focussed aspects of the object. With irony it is also relevant that ironists ascribe different points of view to irony-addressees and themselves, from which they perceive the object, the latter might very well be one of the addressee's forms of behavior.

In the next transcript we see that the ironist strives to illuminate the local point from which his perspectivation starts.

### 3.4. Irony stepwise

The purpose of the next example is to show how the ironist can make an effort to ensure that his irony is received as such. The dialogue which interests us takes place between Sylvia and Fritz. Kilian also adds a few remarks which should, however, not confuse the reader.

Episode 5 (Conversation 9 Episode 3)

Anton (A), Beate (B), Fritz (F), Helena (H), Kilian (K), Sylvia (S)

- 1 S: ich will, (-) en Orangensaft mit Mineralwasser.  
*I want (-) an orange juice with mineral water.*

- 2 K: obs hier Orangensaft gibt?  
*is there any orange juice here?*
- 3 (2.0)
- > 4 F: wie wärs mit Pfirs Pfirsich Maracuja?  
*how about pea- peach Maracuya?*
- 5 K: aber ich trink doch [einen Wein.  
*but I do want to drink [wine.*
- > 6 F: [aus unserer reichhaltigen Bar.  
*[from our well-stocked bar.*
- > 7 S: sehr gut.  
*very good.*
- 8 K: [HAHAHA
- > 9 F: [HAHAHA ich glaub Du spinnst.  
*[HAHAHA I think you are crazy.*
- 10 H: HAHAHA
- 11 S: (? ?)
- 12 F: also, O-Saft hab ich noch. aber Mineralwasser,  
*well, I still have o-juice. but mineral water,*
- 13 S: dann mit Wasser gemischt. dann misch ich selber.  
*then mixed with water. then I will mix it myself.*

Sylvia very directly expresses her wish for a specific drink mix. Kilian, her boyfriend and also a guest, already expresses doubt about whether the ingredients for the drink are available. Then the host, Fritz, asks whether an even more unusual juice, peach maracuya, would also be all right (4). Kilian names what he wants to drink independently of this dialogue, and Fritz now adds a characterization of the place where he is thinking of getting Sylvia's drink (*from our well-stocked bar*). Fritz lives in a student communal flat (Wohngemeinschaft), and it is thus obvious that they do not have a *well-stocked bar*. At this point it becomes clear retrospectively that as early as line 4 Fritz reacted ironically. *Peach Maracuya* is considered very exotic in Germany; peach juice is expensive, and it is hard to even find maracuya juice. Pointing to the *well-stocked bar* ironically perspectivizes the place where Fritz lives, characterizes his speaking standpoint.

Sylvia welcomes the suggestion (7). It cannot be decided on the basis of her "very good" whether she seriously welcomes the suggested drink or whether her response is likewise to be located in a playful theatrical frame. Kilian and Fritz laugh. Kilian probably grasped the subtle irony in Fritz's words, and Sylvia may have as well. But this cannot be determined by text analysis. It often happens that an ironic act elicits a playful reaction. When Fritz suggests laughingly and hyperbolically that Sylvia is mentally disturbed (*ich glaub du spinnst - I think you are crazy*) it becomes completely clear that he has reacted to her wish ironically and thereby perspectivized the wish as excessive. Fritz himself makes sure that his irony is recognized step by step as such. By her reactions he could not have been sufficiently sure that Sylvia understood his irony. Thereupon Helena in line 10 also laughs. Then Fritz states quite earnestly which drinks he has in his stock (elliptical) and Sylvia accepts a different

drink combination (with normal tap water) before he has finished his sentence. Sylvia's interruption contextualizes here a willingness to be satisfied with a different drink.

By proposing an exotic combination in the context of a student household in line 4, Fritz implies that Sylvia might believe he has all these sophisticated drinks available. He assumes her perspective in his irony and conveys it as misleading.

I reject taking politeness as a dominant reason for irony (Kotthoff 1996a,b, 1997, 1998). By irony we achieve something else: a contrast of evaluative perspectives. If irony were "off-record" (Brown/Levinson 1987, Barbe 1995), then why would anyone go to the trouble of making the implicit meaning clear?

Fritz's dismissal in line 9 is highly implicit, but not more polite than directly turning down the drink request. Certainly the most polite way of turning down requests is to express sincere regret (I'm terribly sorry, etc.). His introductory laughter before "I think you are crazy" ensures that this impoliteness is not interpreted as hostile. As a response to his sauciness Helena also laughs. In the context it is clear that Fritz thereby again evaluates Sylvia's request.

Fritz's irony here is not an off-record strategy in the sense of Brown/Levinson, although at the start very different readings are definitely possible. Lines 4 and 6 need not necessarily be understood as irony. By working out the irony stepwise, Fritz can mark a potentially face-threatening request for a specific drink which he does not have in stock as out of the ordinary (evaluation) and reject Sylvia's request as inappropriate. Shared social knowledge of what drink ingredients young German people normally have at home plays a role. Irony seems to be suitable for people to communicate complex perspectives to one another which go beyond politeness. Without ethnographic knowledge about the image politics which the participants communicate as a whole and about how they stand to one another, it can hardly be determined whether Fritz's behavior is face-threatening for Sylvia or even face-affirming. Sylvia is perspectivized by Fritz as having exotic and unusual wishes. Since Sylvia often communicates an identity in which these attributes are very positively regarded, we could assume here that dimensions of her face are also affirmed.

Irony communicates social difference. A group, be it a family or a clique of friends, must manage individual uniqueness and social cohesion, being similar and being different at the same time. Irony communicates mutual knowledge about one another and divergent perspectives in an often surprising way.

#### **4. Echo-irony or pseudo-quotation?**

In the following we discuss an episode which does not allow us to decide whether we have a case of mention-irony or pseudo-quotation. The reactions do not clarify how the irony was processed.

Episode 6 (Conversation 12 Episode 4)

Annette (A), Bernd (B), Friederike (F), Lars (L), Martin (M)

- 1 F: hier hats ja nur ein Fenster.  
*there is only one window.*
- > 2 L: is aber doch schön fürn jungen Herrn. weischt.  
*but it is really nice for a young gentleman. you know.*
- > 3 A: ja das reiHHHcht fürn jungen Mann.  
*yes, it suffices for a young man.*
- > 4 L: fürn jungen Herrn, sagt Deine Mutter immer.  
*for a young gentleman, your mother always says.*

Bernd is showing his friends around his new flat. Friederike suddenly notes that Bernd's kitchen has only one window and will accordingly be dimly lit during the daytime. Thereupon Lars delivers a phrase from the repertoire of elderly women (*really nice for a young gentleman*). Annette agrees with him in line 3 and raises the level of playful impoliteness (*it suffices for a young man*). Bernd is defined as a *young gentleman* who does not need a brightly illuminated kitchen. This activity integrates dimensions of a mock challenge. In line 4 Lars makes the source of the flowery phrase explicit, Annette's mother. The attribution of domains and objects to gentlemen and ladies is found equally absurd in this circle of academics (whose ages are close to 40 and who are only considered young from the perspective of elderly people). It is unclear whether *really nice for a young gentleman* is understood more as a playful compliment or as ironic. Bernd is a journalist who is very often away on business trips. They might really have thought that a rather dark kitchen would suit him. After line 4 brief joint laughter can be heard on the cassette.

Annette and Lars work together on the formulation. It is obviously important for the performance that the wording is correct. One goal of the performance seems to be to evoke a milieu familiar to all, that of their parents' generation.

Distance is also communicated in the double perspectivation. The speakers do not think exactly the way they speak. This difference need not, however, be contrastive. It can very well be that they really believe that the kitchen is adequate for Bernd the way it is. There is only a slight shift in perspectivation, not a contrast.

The difference in regard to the prototype of the ironic (such as line 1 of Episode 4) also lies in the fact that here a perspective is attributed to Annette's mother, who is not present, rather than to the irony object, who is.

## 5. Processing the said and the meant

Episode 7 stems from the same guided tour of Bernd's new apartment.

Episode 7 (Conversation 12 Episode 2)

Annette (A), Bernd (B), Friederike (F), Lars (L), Martin (M)

- > 1 A: seHEhr übersichtlich. doch. schön  
üHÜbersichtlich.HE

- very clearly arranged. really. beautifully arranged.*
- > 2     B:    ja::: HA so kann mans auch sagen. also bald steht  
                   *ye:::s HA that's another way to put it. soon there will be*  
        3            hiern größerer Tisch...  
                   *a larger table here...*

The group arrives in another room which is nearly empty. Annette laughingly utters the adjective *übersichtlich* (clearly arranged), which can have a positive connotation, but in this context does not. Her laughter underlines the incongruity between situative expectation and ambiguous diction. Bernd first accepts her comment, thereby reacting to the said. Then he chuckles at the ambiguous comment, thereby showing that the said is somehow funny. Then he explains what is still to be done in the apartment, thereby reacting to the implicated message that the room is too empty. His three-step reception shows that he likewise understood the literal and the ironic meaning of Annette's remark. By analyzing the reception of friendly irony we can support the "graded saliency hypothesis of irony." Annette attributes to Bernd a very positive perspective on his unfurnished flat and he first accepts the perspective (by saying *ja:::*) and then enlightens her. *Clearly arranged* is intertextual; it alludes to a scene in a film by the German Comedian Loriot. In a restaurant Loriot and his date have ordered a nouvelle cuisine dish and are served a large plate containing nothing but a bit of fish and two pea pods. Then they comment: how clearly arranged. In the above example, however, even without the relevant background knowledge it is clear that the room is rather barren. Bernd accepts the witty irony and then also corrects the perspective assigned to him that he might find this arrangement good.

## 6. Prototypes of staged intertextuality

In conclusion I would like to work out types of staged intertextuality, drawing on prototype theory. I briefly remind the reader how Rosch's (1973) prototype approach is constructed.

In prototype theory it is assumed that elements are more or less typical for a category (Rosch/Mervis 1975). A typical (the "most typical") bird is the sparrow; the pelican is gradually located more to the periphery of the category. The prototype is determined by the cumulation principle (it shows the most family resemblances), the representation principle (it shares the most features with other elements of a category) and the distance principle (it shares the least number of attributes with elements of other categories). A prototypical utterance type could, e.g., be one which first comes to mind for members of a culture and from which the other types are most likely to be derived.

We can extract four prototypes of staged intertextuality: quotation, parody, pseudo-quotation, and irony. Quotations differ in the degree of claimed authenticity. Here we take quotations with a high claim to authenticity as the prototype. In the news media this claim is

high, in everyday narration low. We would take it amiss, for example, if a news announcer were to stage former German Chancellor Kohl's words in such a way that Kohl appeared self-indulgent and phlegmatic. But of course in other contexts we could stage him in that way; then we would be in the domain of parody. If I use Kohl's words to utter a position close to my own, we are in the domain of pseudo-quotation. If, however, someone attributes a position/perspective to Kohl in a TV-discussion, implicitly distancing himself from it in such a way that listeners can assign the contrary position to him, then we are in the domain of irony. He can also quote Kohl's words without *verba dicendi* and mean the contrary (as an evaluative cleft); this is a case of echo-irony.

### **Texts with two voices:**

#### Non-Stylized Quotation

Reported speech (i.e. news) with a claim to authenticity:

- voice attribution is explicit
- little, if any, perspectivation/evaluation
- no implicatum

#### Parody

Evaluatively reported speech

- voice attribution is explicit
- double perspectivation/evaluation: more or less consonant
- dictum is attributed to an absent or present person
- implicatum is close to the dictum, but has to be inferred

#### Pseudo-quotation:

- voice attribution is implicit
- double perspectivation/evaluation: more or less consonant
- dictum is attributed to an absent person or a social group
- implicatum is close to the dictum, but has to be inferred

#### Irony

- voice attribution is implicit
- contrasting (dissonant) perspectivation/evaluation
- dictum is attributed to a present addressee or an absent person
- implicatum is attributed to the ironist

Without going into greater detail here with regard to prototype-theory, I am of the opinion that we can distinguish these four ideal types. Of course, we must expect overlaps in the transitional areas.

### **Conclusion:**

In this article I have discussed irony as a case of contrastive double perspectivation. Irony stages two voices which evaluatively oppose one another. In everyday life we also deal with other types of double voicing, as with quotations with a higher or lower claim to authenticity. In the first case the second voice comes close to the first, in the second the intention of the current speaker dominates. The quoted speaker is stylized with an intention to

parody. Finally, we work with forms of pseudo-quotation; we play with others' voices and dictions, but we basically mean what we say. The distancing from the words uttered can be stronger or weaker.

In addition, on the basis of conversational episodes I have tried to answer the question of whether in irony we process the said and the implicated, or only the implicated. In various ways the reactions of irony addressees show that they have grasped what was said. If they react on the level of the said they recreate a play-frame (in the sense of Bateson 1953).

### Transcription Conventions

|                 |  |
|-----------------|--|
| (-)             | one hyphen indicates a short pause                                 |
| (- -)           | two hyphens indicate a longer pause<br>(less than half a second)   |
| (0.5)           | pause of half a second; long pauses are<br>counted in half seconds |
| (?was that so?) | indicates uncertain transcription                                  |
| (? ?)           | points to an incomprehensible utterance                            |
| ..[.....        |  |
| ..[.....        | shows overlap; two simultaneous voices                             |
| =               | latching of an utterance by a speaker;<br>no interruption          |
| HAHAHA          | laughter   |
| HEHEHE          | weak laughter  |
| HOHOHO          | laughter vowel transcribed as heard                                |
| (H)             | audible exhalation   |
| ('H)            | audible inhalation   |
| ?               | high rising intonation   |
| .               | falling intonation   |
| ,               | ongoing (slightly rising) intonation<br>("more to come")           |
| :               | indicates that preceding sound is<br>elongated                     |
| BLABLA          | louder and higher  |
| ↑< >            | higher pitch within the pointed brackets                           |
| ↑< >            | lower pitch within the pointed brackets                            |
| ↑               | high onset for one word  |
| ((sits down ))  | non-verbal actions or comments                                     |
| <<p> >          | piano (the last < marks the scope)                                 |
| <<pp> >         | pianissimo   |
| <<rit> >        | slower   |
| <<acc> >        | faster   |
| <<staccatto> >  | word by word   |
| <<artificial> > | impressionistic comments   |

### Notes



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1. This article is a slightly elaborated version of InLiSt-working paper No. 5, University of Konstanz 1998.
  2. Overviews on irony research are offered, e.g., by Lapp 1992 and Barbe 1995.
  3. In Giora 1997 and Giora/Kotthoff 1997 the "graded salience hypothesis of irony" is proved on the basis of experimental data and conversation analytic studies of talk from natural surroundings. The data show different response types to irony. With friendly irony there were many reactions to the literal meaning of ironic remarks which we take as a proof that not only the implicated message is processed but also the literal.
  4. Some scholars, e.g., Barbe 1995, see the achievement of irony in making criticism more polite. They do not clarify what the advantage of irony is compared to friendly, sympathetic or mild criticism. Kotthoff 1996b shows that it makes no sense to declare irony context-independently as polite or impolite.
  5. Experimental irony research does not, even today, assume that the listener also has an influence on the situation or is much more than a passive recipient. Typically experimental raters are presented short dialogues with and without irony; they are asked to judge whether the ironic or direct utterance is funnier, more or less insulting or displays more or less control of emotions (e.g., Dews/Kaplan/Winner 1995). In natural situations the addressee never judges in such a value-free manner, but rather is personally affected and actively responds with counter-irony, laughter or whatever.
  6. Wilson and Sperber's favorite example is called "nice weather today," said to a mailcarrier who is standing outside in the rain.
  7. See Wilss 1989 on properties of allusion.
  8. Pfister 1985 and Lachmann 1990 locate two different positions in the debate on intertextuality, namely a narrower and a broader one. The narrower relates more to Bakhtin in its description of sense constitution: the broader conception aims at questioning possibilities of bounded textuality as such. We speak of staged intertextuality when procedures can be pinned down in the text which indicate that not only the message, but also the staging of the message should be processed.
  9. Jaffe (2000) discusses similar intertextual strategies in comic performance on Corsica. She describes how comedians draw on a bilingual linguistic and metalinguistic cultural repertoire.
  10. Couper-Kuhlen 1998 discusses an instance where listeners ask a speaker whether she spoke in her own voice or someone else's. But often we cannot make progress with conversation analytic procedures, which exclusively explain the meaning of an utterance by examining the responses the utterance received.
  11. Attardo 1995 discusses cases such as this as "register humor."
  12. In Kotthoff (forthcoming) I try to demonstrate with data from two different settings that responses to critical and friendly irony differ and (re)shape the ongoing interaction as jocular teasing or as a serious debate on an issue of disagreement.
  13. Sandig 1996 also suggests this.